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Counting Carbon: calculative activism and slippery infrastructure 
 
Abstract 
The environmental movement in the global North is in a state of impasse. It appears 
that despite the renewed international focus on climate change, and the actions of 
innumerable social movements, a ‘solution’ to the problem appears as one, without a 
viable solution. It is the contention of this paper that climate change has no clearly viable 
solution as it is a seemingly impossible problem. This paper investigates how the 
problem of climate change is constructed as a global object of political action and how it 
functions to render politics into a matter of calculative action, one that seeks – but fails – 
to take hold of a slippery carbon infrastructure. It concludes by suggesting one possible 
solution to this dilemma is to turn away from the global scalar logic of climate change 
and towards a situated focus on questions of infrastructure, or what Dimitris 
Papadopoulos calls “thick justice”.  
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Introduction 
In recent years it seems as though climate change has come back onto the international 
political agenda with a vengeance. China’s massive investment in renewable energy 
infrastructure, persistent problems with extreme fossil fuel extraction, talk of stranded 
fossil fuel assets, the various attentions of Presidents, Prime Ministers and the Pope, and 
the naming of the Anthropocene have all contributed to the sense of a public revival of 
interest in climate change as a political problem across much of the global Northi.  
However, despite the renewed focus on climate change and numerous environmental 
‘wins’, traction appears elusive. No matter what action is taken or policy is implemented 
it never appears to be sufficient. Or more accurately, it is never said to ‘add up’ to 
anywhere near enough. One example: at the time of writing two separate accounts of 
national UK greenhouse gas reduction pledges have been published setting out how 
existing pledges of emission reductions fail to adequately address climate change (Reuters 
2015). Both show that the existing pledges add up to more than 20C (one suggests they 
add up to a potentially catastrophic 3.50C)ii. And this is the accounting of promises – 
actually existing national policies add up to 3.3-3.80C by 2100. 
As writer-activist Bill McKibben (2013) and climatologist Kevin Anderson (2012) have 
famously suggested, there is a brutal mathematics to climate change, one that necessitates 
almost unimaginably vast socio-economic transformations on a global scale within a very 
short timeframe. Anderson’s work is exemplary in that he argues that emissions needed 
to peak in 2015 for there to be an even chance of climate change being contained to 
‘only’ 20C (ibid). It has been suggested that it is in actual fact too late to do anything 
more than contain the future damage of climate change, and work towards adaption on a 
hotter planet (Hamilton 2010; McKibben 2010). Thus the brutality of the mathematics of 
climate change is compounded by a ‘brutal’ sense of what we could call scientific 
realismiii, where hope resides not in averting disaster but minimizing its falloutiv.  
Much faith is placed in national governments to act, either to arrest or mitigate future 
climate change. This faith appears to have waned after the failed 2009 international 
climate change negotiations in Copenhagen, and this crisis of faith has only deepened 
over the intervening years as national governments have singularly failed to negotiate an 
international climate change treaty or realize mitigation policies that would successfully 
contain future global warming to less than 20C. Here my focus is not on the 
shortcomings of governments or transnational corporations however. Rather I will 
explore a different supposition: namely, what if we suppose that at least part of the 
problem with climate change is how it is constituted as a matter of political concern, that 
the construction of climate change as a socio-scientific fact limits how we can act 
politically on climate change? That is, what if the problem with climate change is the 
problem itself? 
This paper sets out to explore how climate change is formed as a matter of political 
concern within grassroots environmental movements through an exploration of one 
particular instance of environmental direct action in the UK: the No Dash for Gas 
power station occupation in 2012. I argue that the climate change imaginary (Hulme 
2009; Luke 2015) at work within the UK environmental milieu configures climate change 
as a kind of mathematical object. While this mathematical rendering of climate change 
enables taking hold of it as a political issue (Stengers and Pignarre 2011) despite its 
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abstract and global nature (Jasanoff 2010), it produces a globalizing synoptic logic, one 
that effectively disables localized action on climate change (Clark 2012).  
The shortfall between specific actions that fail to add up and the global scale of climate 
change induces a form of calculative pragmatism, one that pushes questions of radical 
social transformation to one side as ever-more achievable reductions in CO2 are sought 
out. I argue this forms the basis for the current impasse in climate change politics in the 
global Northv and requires abandoning climate change as a political object in favor of an 
emphasis on questions of what Dimitris Papadopoulos has called “thick justice” 
(2010:147). 
As such this paper sits at the intersection of two bodies of research. This first is the 
existing field of work on social and environmental movements within radical geography, 
where one of the key concerns is how social movements and affected communities can 
and do create the capacities to act powerfully on the worlds they inhabit, and how the 
future is produced as a contested space (Chatterton, Featherstone and Routledge 2013; 
Featherstone et al. 2012; Feigenbaum, Frenzel and McCurdy 2013; Neville and Weinthal 
2016; North 2011; Plows 2008; Saunders and Price 2009). As I set out in the following 
section, much of this field takes up an affirmationist orientation, one that produces an 
analytical lacuna. The second body of research is the emerging field of infrastructure 
studies, one that takes in works from geography, anthropology and science and 
technology studies (Anand et al. 2012; Furlong 2010; Howe et al. 2015; Jensen and 
Morita 2015; Larkin 2013; Star and Ruhleder 1996). Where the first often focuses on 
human actors, the second explores how the material work works to condition the kinds 
of actions that can be taken, and what forms of life are made possible (or impossible) 
through socio-technical infrastructure (Papadopoulos 2014). 
The affirmationist gap 
To suggest that the current impasse in climate change politics is in part due to how 
climate change as a problem has been constituted is not to suggest that environmental 
activism is either dishonest or misusing ‘the science’. Indeed, much of the literature on 
UK environmental activism and produced within the movement itself openly debates 
how climate science (and climate activism) are to be interpreted (Saunders 2012; Shift 
and Dysophia 2010). Taking my cue from environmental historian Peter Hay, I contend 
that modern environmentalism has always been in deep conversation with scientific 
literature (2002:47) and that there is a porosity between the milieus of environmental 
activism and environmental science. 
It could be suggested that to even question the composition of the problem of climate 
change is to court the denial industry and the interests arrayed in opposition to action on 
environmental issues (Oreskes and Conway 2011). Such a stance would reflect the 
disavowal of uncertainty by climate scientists themselves (Shackley and Wynne 1996). In 
both instances there is an apparent felt need to affirm: in the first instance, to affirm that 
environmentalism is working; in the second to affirm that climate change is a fact, and 
that this fact necessitates active concern. 
While these are not a single affirmation, they share a common political orientation. This 
common orientation combines a suspicion of negativity grounded in the fear of its 
totalizing effects with a form of politics that ontologises resistance as necessarily being 
constructive and affirming (Noys 2010:ix-xii;9-13). This affirmationist stance denies any 
role to destructive or negative gestures, thus making for brittle modes of political praxis. 
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Such a stance makes for a defensive atmosphere amongst climate scientists. The 
construction of scientific facts is especially contestable within climate science because of 
the way those facts are articulated through processes of approximation and abstraction 
(Edwards 2010; Jasanoff 2010). The facts of climate change manifest as a range of 
possible futures – emissions pathways and possible temperature variations. Translating 
these matters of fact into matters of concern is thus necessarily an open process, one that 
resists closure as would be afforded by more concrete facts that would function to 
effectively silence critics (Demeritt 2006:472; Latour 2004b; Stengers 2000). 
At stake here is the political question of who can make nature speak, and who will be 
listened to when doing so thus conferring social legitimacy (Demeritt 2006; Stengers 
2000:81). That climate change is a fact is, in the UK, in little dispute (Rogers 2013). What 
is in dispute are what the facts ‘mean’ (Demeritt 2006:472). As suggested by Mike 
Hulme, what they ‘mean’ is deeply entwined with economic and political calculation – 
with the question of what sort of socio-economic system humanity will inhabit in the 
future (2009). And not just the future but also in the uneven present (Parenti 2011). 
Climate change as a fact is not only a matter of approximation and abstraction, but also 
of the economic calculus of emissions pathways and the energy intensity of production 
methods, as outlined by innumerable environmental and scientific authors (Anderson 
2013; Hamilton 2010; Hulme 2009; Inman 2010; Klein 2014; Monbiot 2007; Spratt et al. 
2009; Stern 2006; World Bank 212). To resist uncertainty within climate science then 
could be said to be a means of defending a specific formulation of climate change as a 
problem, one that necessitates dramatic socio-economic transformations including the 
end of global economic growth (Jackson 2011; Klein 2014; Spratt et al. 2009). 
Affirmationism thus appears as a device for reducing the range of how the fact of climate 
change can be constituted as a political concern. This approach to climate change is 
common not only to the articulation of climate science, or amongst climate activists but 
extends more broadly to radical scholarship that contends with the practices of 
environmental politics. 
Current literature on climate change politics and activism in the UK sets out how recent 
campaigns and protests can be understood to have been successful despite the lack of 
success on the issue of climate change itself (i.e., Chatterton, Featherstone and Routledge 
2013; Plows 2008; Saunders and Price 2009). For the most part the question of success 
or failure is not dealt with in the terms set by various campaigns or organizational goals, 
which often state that arresting climate change is the primary objective of taking action. 
Rather, what I called affirmationist literature instead focuses on the positive outcomes of 
climate activism while avoiding the question of success or failure vis-à-vis climate change 
itself. 
The affirmation of climate change activism is undertaken through a focus the positive 
transformative effects of environmental activism on social and political capacities 
(Featherstone 2013). The political framework of climate activists is said to provide an 
alternative antagonistic political framework focused on global solidarity and commons-
building (Chatterton, Featherstone and Routledge 2013; Featherstone 2013), one that is 
prefigured through the specific organisational forms used by climate activist movements 
(Feigenbaum, Frenzel and McCurdy 2013; Frenzel 2014). 
While this literature acknowledges the ambivalences of existing climate activism, this has 
not led to calls for it a substantive transformation (Sealey-Huggins 2016). And while 
there have been numerable articles exploring the tensions within climate activism 
between ‘reformist’ and ‘radical’ positions (Bomberg 2012; Harding 2015; Saunders 2012; 
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Saunders and Price 2009), by and large these pieces have focused on the internal 
organizational dynamics of climate activism, or the social composition of environmental 
activism as a movement, as the cause of political impasse and tended to concluded that 
what is required is to fuse or combine the varied modes of political action, often at a 
greater ‘scale’, rather than revisit their collective failures (Bergman 2014; Kenis 2014; 
North 2011; North and Longhurst 2013; Saunders 2012). Many conclude that despite the 
ambivalences and (often undiscussed) failures of climate activism, that it has had a 
transformative effect either on the forms of oppositional politics or on broader political 
frameworks within which climate change is discussed (Barry and Quilley 2008; Bomberg 
2012; Chatterton, Featherstone and Routledge 2013; Featherstone 2013; Frenzel 2014; 
McGregor 2015; North 2011; Plows 2008; Saunders 2012; Saunders and Price 2009). 
By making an explicit connection to a vision of activism as active citizenship, activism is 
additionally examined as the building of political and material capacities over generations 
(Plows 2000; 2008; Rootes 2011). Place-based activism here is often explicitly bound to 
the positing of a broader environmental movement, where the ‘local’ is understood 
tacitly as part of a more expansive process of social transformation (Neville and Weinthal 
2016), when not cast as an impediment to the realization of a more powerful climate 
movement (North and Longhurst 2013). This is said to be part of a broader empowering 
of civil society vis-à-vis governmental and market actors, one that enables civil society to 
move both to take appropriate action on issues such as climate change. 
These approaches to the transformative power of environmental activism suggest that 
environmental activists produce change either as an intervening force that transforms 
what is considered to be possible (McGregor 2015) or as a constituent force that builds 
autonomous institutions of social power (Barry and Quilley 2008; Saunders and Price 
2009). While this body of literature is not entirely uncritical (i.e., Saunders 2012) it acts to 
affirm the idea that climate activism is positively engaged in social transformation despite 
the shortcomings of existing action on climate change, and what is required for greater 
‘success’ is, if anything, an intensification and scalar expansion of existing forms of 
climate activism. 
This body of work mirrors many of the claims of climate activists themselves, where 
while the explicit targets of actions and campaigns has varied over the past decade or 
more, the tactics and strategies remain essentially the same – prefigurative organisational 
forms and protest camps and spectacular direct actions (Feigenbaum, Frenzel and 
McCurdy 2013). The lack of variation and the question of success or failure was openly 
addressed within the climate activist milieu (Camp 2010; Shift and Dysophia 2010). 
These moments of reflexivity did not translate into negativity however: neither the 
constitution of the fact of climate change, its ‘brutal mathematics’, nor activism as an 
appropriate form of political action on climate change have come into open question in 
light of previous failures. What has come to be the fault line of activist and academic 
contention in many cases is the question of working against (radically) or within 
(reformism) existing institutional frameworks (Saunders 2012; Shift and Dysophia 2010). 
The exception to the general tone of affirmationism within the literature centers on the 
postpolitical role of science (Bryant 2016). This body of geographical work is largely 
conducted through an account of environmentalism as a form of postpolitics 
(Swyngedouw 2008; 2010; 2013). Postpolitical here signals the transformation of 
environmental political praxis from one concerned with ‘properly’ political questions to 
one focused on technical policy solutions, framed within neo-classical and neoliberal 
economic orthodoxy, that are presented in place of properly political debate and 
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discussion (Crouch 2012; Valentine 2005). While a much contested concept (Dean 2009; 
McCarthy 2013; Valentine 2005), this approach has been particularly used in relation to 
Climate Camp (Bowman 2010; Schlembach 2011; Schlembach, Lear and Bowman 2012), 
producing some useful insights on how climate science discourse was mobilised by 
climate activist network Climate Camp to often stifle debate or internal dissent, as well as 
outlining some of the lived social and political tensions of the Camp, indicating how 
science introduced a degree of friction into the political praxis of climate activism vis-à-
vis the Camp. 
However the conversation between climate science and environmental activism in the 
UK is little explored beyond noting the adoption and translation of science into activist 
policy (Schlembach, Lear and Bowman 2012). The processes of scientific knowledge 
constitution and the mobilisation of knowledge within activist praxis is under theorised, 
with the result being an account of UK environmental activism that lacks any substantive 
discussion of how scientific knowledge of climate change is produced or of the role of 
environmental activists in producing such knowledge. In addition, the postpolitical 
analysis tends to treat science as a specific kind of exhaustive fact, one that paralyses 
political activism and that can only imply technical or policy solutions, an account at 
odds with the long history of environmental studies and history, as well as that of science 
and technology studies (Castree 2014; Demeritt 2001; 2006; Dryzek 2005; Fortun 2001; 
Haraway 1991; 1997; Hay 2002; Jasanoff 2010; Latour 2004a). As such, while presenting 
a welcome intervention into the collective framework of environmental praxis, this 
second tendency fails to offer a sufficiently critical account of the constitution of the 
facts of climate change and thus of the object of climate activism. Thus the postpolitical 
literature works to evacuate politics from science, deepening the fact-concern divide and 
uncoupling political practice from scientific fact.  
Occupying the climate 
In late October 2012, around 20 activists broke into and occupied West Burton gas-fired 
power station in Nottinghamshire. 11 of the activists scaled one of the power stations 
cooling towers, making camp at the top. The power station operators shut down the 
cooling tower, while the protestors begun to claim victory via their twitter account: 
“[we are] preventing emissions every hour” (12:32 PM - 30 Oct 2012) 
“Every day we're up here we're preventing 2371 tonnes of CO2 emissions - the amount 
an average home takes 182 years to emit” (4:20 AM - 1 Nov 2012) 
“At 7am this morning our occupation had prevented 10,000 tonnes of CO2 from 
polluting the atmosphere!” (2:09 AM - 2 Nov 2012) 
The aim of the occupation was to both stop the construction of the gas-fired power 
station and to “expose the madness of a government that is totally in the thrall of the big 
energy companies” (NDG protestor, Jasiewicz 2012). It was a two-fold action that 
sought to directly stop greenhouse gas emissions (present and future) and at the same 
time produce a public spectacle that sought to pressure government into changing its 
approach to energy policies. 
“As our name suggests, No Dash for Gas planned this action to bring attention to the 
coalition’s reckless plans to build a new wave of dirty gas power stations. The energy and 
climate change secretary, Ed Davey, recently announced that the government wants to 
encourage as many as 20 of these plants to be constructed by 2030. But as the 
government’s climate adviser, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), has warned, 
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this risks pushing the UK out of reach of meeting its legally binding carbon reduction 
targets.”(NDG protestor quoted in Carter 2012: un pg) 
“The climate change bill commits us to 80% initial reductions by 2050 with 60% by 
2030, so building a new generation of gas fire power stations will make it impossible to 
reach these targets.” (NDG protestor quoted in Paget 2012: un pg) 
The chimney occupation was the UK’s longest power station occupation (Wainwright 
2012c). It was also the first and only time climate change protestors had shut down a 
power station (ibid), and thus could be called one of the most successful climate change 
direct actions in UK environmental history. The organizational precursor to No Dash for 
Gas (NDG) was Climate Camp, an organization that existed for 5 years and organized 
numerous mass actions in the UK (Camp 2009). Climate Camp had unsuccessfully 
attempted on numerous occasions to disrupt the functioning or shut down power 
stations over its five-year history, starting in 2006. The environmental non-governmental 
organization Greenpeace had also previously scaled power station chimneys, most 
notably at a power station in Kent, yet also without disrupting their operations (Adam 
and Tran 2009). 
“Our motivation for this protest is to try and stop this government from locking us into 
a dependency on gas for the next 30 years” (NDG protestor, quoted in Wainwright 
2012a) 
NDG explicitly focused on how the future is organized through government energy 
policies; specifically, they treat the future as something materially produced in the present 
through infrastructure. Both climate change and infrastructure organize and ‘lock in’ 
particular futures. Greenhouse gases take centuries to be fully reabsorbed into the 
Earth’s carbon cycle (Archer 2009). Hence when the carbon cycle is disrupted it 
transforms the very conditions of life for generations to come. Here we could outline 
how climate change will produce lower crop yields and shortages of fresh water, making 
for a thirstier and hungrier world, of that there will be increases in severe storms and 
droughts, making for a harsher world, or even that the world of the future will be much 
less diverse, with fewer species, degraded habitats and emptier oceans, making for a silent 
earth (Lynas 2008; McKibben 2010).  
In all these ways and more climate change shapes what kinds of lives people can live on 
Earth, and thus is a matter of what Papadopoulos calls “thick justice” (2010:137). Thick 
justice signals a shift away from liberal humanist conceptions of justice as a matter of 
redistribution and correction within existing material conditions towards the question of 
material conditions themselves (ibid:145). Thick justice focuses on how infrastructure 
conditions the lives we can live – on the question of what forms of life infrastructure 
enables and disables, produces and inhibits (ibid). Thick justice is also a matter of 
addressing the question of sacrifice or abandonment of some peoples and lifeworlds in 
order to maintain others (Povinelli 2011), the role of making absent or silent certain 
peoples and lives within ‘legitimate’ political debate (Braun and Whatmore 2010:76), and 
of recognizing that to be for some worlds is to necessarily be against others (Haraway 
1997:37).  
Thick justice denotes a form of activism (Papadopoulos 2010:137) that focuses on the 
constitution of material conditions themselves, on what forms of life infrastructure 
enables and disables, produces and inhibits (Jensen and Morita 2015; Star and Ruhleder 
1996; Winner 1986). It focuses attention on how the conditions of life produced through 
infrastructure are a crucial site of contestation and resistance (Boyer forthcoming; Howe 
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et al. 2015). And, going beyond resistance, it asks what an energy infrastructure molded 
by thick justice would look like and how politics and political agency is transformed by 
material activist practices (Papadopoulos 2014). 
When the UK government sets out a program of power station construction they set out 
a framework for how people in the UK will engage with and be constituted by energy 
production for years to come, effectively ‘locking in’ a particular form of life organized 
around and through a centralized energy grid powered by fossil fuels.  
How to count carbon 
What makes climate change as a problem legible is the mathematics of a particular 
particle – carbon dioxide (CO2). CO2 functions within the climate imaginary 
(Cornerhouse 2010; Luke 2015) as a kind of universal equivalent that enables the 
commensuration of quite different and disparate processes, objects and matters of fact 
(Demeritt 2001; 2006). While CO2 can and does function as a commodity fetish 
(Cornerhouse 2010; Swyngedouw 2013:4-5), within government policy and 
environmental politics it is more accurate to say that it functions as what Bruno Latour 
calls a factish (2010).  
A factish differs from a fetish in that it retains the trace of its manufacture (Haraway 
1997:136; Latour 2010:2-3), unlike the commodity fetish that obscures its origins within 
the relations of production (Marx 1990). As such, a factish does not mystify its origins. It 
retains a power over its creators despite its opacity however, one that derives from its 
functionality: it is a pragmatic construct. A factish enables one to make the world ‘speak’ 
in a particular way (Stengers 2000), to engage materially with a specific problem. And in 
doing so to shapes not only the kinds of questions that can be asked but crucially 
legitimates a particular line of questioning as factual. In producing itself as a ‘natural 
truth’ through experimental success, a factish constitutes itself as a necessary fiction 
securing its discursive and sociotechnical power as a matter of fact (Latour 2004b). When 
matters of fact such as climate change are successfully made into matters of concern 
(ibid) this sociotechnical power is drawn into broader socio-political and policy 
discourses. 
How something comes to be a necessary fiction shapes the capacities it has as a factish. 
CO2 is a necessary fiction insofar as climate science requires the production of a means 
to calculate and experiment with the Earth’s climatic system. Climate change is a 
planetary phenomenon, one that is not directly available to experience but only knowable 
through computer models (Edwards 2010; Weart 2008). As such it is inseparable from 
the instruments and sociotechnical relations through which we come to know it (Jasanoff 
2010; Stengers 2000): in particular, the computer models that we use to simulate the 
Earth’s climate. But more than this our knowledge of climate change is in certain senses 
inseparable from broader processes of globalization. Climate change is a novel 
ontological problem (Blok, Nakazora and Winthereik 2016:1), “an object of massive 
scientific attention, transnational political contestation, and a focal point for emerging 
legal–ethical ideals of globalism” that produces the phenomenon of a global 
environmental problem that manifests within a global ecological regime. The socio-
technical knowledge’s, collaborations, research programs and inter-governmental 
projects that constitute the basis for climate change science is an outcome of processes 
of globalization (Edwards 2010). As such there is a shared envisioning framework that 
binds the calculative logic of climate change science to the hierarchical orderings of 
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globalization where the local is always subordinated to global processes and projects 
(Massey 2014). 
To make the calculations of the computer models work what is required is a calculable 
‘proxy’ for the various processes at work within the Earth-system (Cornerhouse 
2010:37). While CO2 comprises less than half of all greenhouse gases it comes to stand in 
for all of them as well as the geological, biological and meteorological processes out of 
which emerges climate change as a environmental problem (Archer 2009:38). CO2 is 
used to ‘think’ and see climate change and frames how we understand and then act on it 
as a problem (Luke 2015). Climate change is mathematical and abstract in nature as a 
problem (Hulme 2009; Jasanoff 2010:234), and this shapes environmental praxis in two 
ways. First it produces a global scale of reference – all actions must make sense and refer 
to the global scale of climate change. Secondly it creates a framework for political action 
on climate change: one counts carbon emissions in order to reduce them.  
The logic of climate change activism sets out from a global frame of reference and works 
‘down’ towards specific responses to climate change through a process of carbon 
calculus – by literally ‘counting carbon’ in order to figure out how to reduce CO2 
emissions step by step.  
Calculative action at work 
“The occupiers have so far prevented 2,371 tonnes of CO2 emissions a day by shutting 
down the one working chimney. This is equivalent to the energy that an average home 
uses for 182 years, or taking 465 cars off the road for a year.” (Wainwright 2012b) 
"We stopped 20,000 tonnes of CO2 being emitted, prevented any construction work on 
the site for a week and got our message about how reckless and ridiculous George 
Osborne's proposed 'dash for gas' is out to thousands of people. I'm proud of what 
we've achieved – but it's only the start of the battle for our energy future." (NDG 
protestor quoted in Wainwright 2012c) 
The above figures were repeated across a number of media outlets and taken from NDG 
press releases and tweets. NDG’s media output outlines how they: prevented a particular 
quantity of CO2 emissions; disrupted the building of new fossil fuel infrastructure and; 
produced a public spectacle that framed the building of new fossil fuelled power stations 
as a matter of public concern (RCP 2012). 
CO2 emissions are used to mark a particular piece of energy infrastructure as politically 
important (stopping the chimney for just over a week produced a reduction of “20,000 
tonnes of CO2”). The action is legitimated in mathematical terms, but these terms do not 
stand on their own. Rather they speak to an implicit referent – the total amount of 
reductions that are needed to address climate change as an issue, a figure that is either 
presented as a percentage – i.e., 80% on 1990 levels – or as a total in tonnes of CO2. The 
immediate outcome of the NDG action can be measured against this total as a sign of 
progress towards addressing the problem of climate change. Progress in this instance 
serves to legitimate the action by framing it as both practical (it works) and necessary (it 
needs to be done). There is also a comparative mathematics at work when the outcome 
of blockading one power station is compared to 465 cars being taken off the road, or one 
day of inactivity for the same power station is equivalent to the energy used in a house 
over 182 years as measure in terms of CO2. The framing effect of this comparison is to 
make cars and power stations fungible by disentangling them from their specific socio-
material relations and making them legible as pieces of climate infrastructure. It also 
works to make it appear as though there is a consensus about the specific objectives of 
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environmental politics as counting carbon in order to reduce carbon emissions (Wolsink 
2010). 
The mathematics of counting carbon enables action to be taken on climate change as an 
issue, first by making actions calculable and therefore legitimate and secondly by re-
politicising climate change as a matter of public infrastructure and not private 
consumption. In this latter instance, the arithmetic of calculative activism has the effect 
of legitimating public infrastructure as a political target. If it is a scientific necessity to 
reduce carbon emissions, and such reductions overwhelmingly have to take place within 
and through infrastructure, then infrastructure is a legitimate target of protest (Vidal 
2008). However, this move to politicize the conditions of life is at once undermined by 
the calculative framework of climate activism.  
The carbon emissions prevented by NDG’s occupation signified the potential reductions 
of carbon emissions that could result from blocking the building of the new power 
station. This potential reduction, made visible by the actual reduction that results from 
the action, only has value within a global accounting of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Framed by the scalar logic of climate change, the question of infrastructure is 
disentangled from other social considerations and subordinated to global carbon 
calculus. In this fashion counting carbon reinforces the autonomy of the global 
technosphere (Massey 2014) even as it subjects economic accounting to an atmospheric 
referent. 
This scaling undermines the potential for enacting thick justice through infrastructural 
campaigns by introducing a particular kind of calculative pragmatism into environmental 
praxis where place is displaced by planet (Heise 2008), one that could be said to mobilise 
a “thin cosmopolitanism” (Dobson 2006)vi and where a kind of global expertise comes to 
stand in as the only legitimate form of political agency vis-à-vis climate change (Mitchell 
2002:41). As such, while it is inaccurate to suggest, pace the postpolitical argument, that 
science undermines politics as a mode of social practice, it does suggest that the practice 
of counting carbon functions to produce and validate a specific set of political agencies 
that take up certain aspects of “high modernism” (Scott 1998:4), most notably the role of 
expertise, the proper scale of political intervention, and scientific rationalism as the 
legitimate analytical and political framework. These political agencies function to disable, 
obscure and invalidate other modes of political agency and non-expert modes of 
knowledge (Mitchell 2002:41). 
While questions of alternative forms of life are often at the heart of infrastructural 
campaigns – how we farm, how we move, what should be sacrificed for how we live – 
with climate infrastructure pragmatism supersedes such concerns. The forms of life 
climate infrastructure ‘locks’ us into are important primarily vis-à-vis greenhouse gas 
emissions; the need to reduce emissions frames justice as a secondary concern, one to be 
addressed after securing the necessary reduction in carbon emissions. Or, perhaps more 
accurately, it suggests justice will be an outcome of emissions reductions and ‘getting the 
climate math right’. 
Slippery infrastructure 
 “When we did the maths this morning and realised what an environmental impact we’re 
making, it suddenly hit home just how important radical action like this can be.” (NDG 
protestor quoted in OT 2012) 
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Calculative activism as undertaken by NDG enables seeing infrastructure in a particular 
way. It makes some locations within the UK’s climate infrastructure more important 
than others, worthier targets for political actions that others. Making climate 
infrastructure commensurate by counting carbon opens up the practical option of 
moving from abstract calculus to site-specific action. But this movement, this way of 
taking hold of climate infrastructure, is not without its ambivalences.  
An encounter with a specific ‘piece’ of infrastructure, even at a discursive level, 
introduces an element of social friction (Tsing 2004). To consider the West Burton 
power station is to consider climate infrastructure as an element of a specific place. 
Taking up Doreen Massey’s notion of place as a site of encounter (2014), what 
considering West Burton power station as a particular instantiation of climate 
infrastructure does is open up debate around the particular encounters is enables and 
produces.  
Much of the debate that took place in the media during and after the action fell into what 
could be considered a classic trope of environmental reporting: the conflict between jobs 
and the environment. In a piece reporting on the protest, one newspaper article ended by 
making the economic stakes of the action clear: 
“Work started on the £600m combined cycle gas turbine station in 2008, with some 
1,000 jobs involved in construction, including a 19km (12 mile) gas pipeline and 
generation equipment to supply power to about 1.5m homes and businesses.” 
(Wainwright 2012a) 
In itself this debate is nothing new – such debates date back to the beginning of the 
modern environment movement (Hay 2002), if not earlier (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016). 
Seen from the perspective of calculative activism such a conflict is often analysed as one 
between a scientifically-literate environmentalism and a labour movement captured by 
the capitalist ideology of limitless growth. And, often in the same breath, the conflict is 
seen as one between two political scales, the global and local, where it is assumed that the 
local will (indeed, must!) make way for the global. What I want to suggest here is that 
both arguments mobilise a common set of globalist logics, where the abstract, de-placed 
and global is both more powerful and more valid than what is cast or described as local 
(Gibson-Graham 2002; Massey 2014; Tsing 2004). I would suggest that calculative 
activism is precisely a means to enforce such a globalised scaling specifically against the 
frictions of situated encounters around climate infrastructure.  
The encounters that make up the place of West Burton power station are not limited to 
those between NDG and the people employed by either the power company EDF or 
various construction companies building the power station. Also entangled are farmers, 
farmer organisations, people who live in the area around the power station, energy 
consumers, an array of local government organizations, regional business and 
government institutions, community and environmental groups, labour unions, political 
parties, environmental and climate scientists, journalists, the national government (from 
MPs and policy wonks to administrative workers and compliance officers) to the various 
institutions of the European Union. Just to name a few. 
Counting carbon offers a means of smoothing over the vast array of potential (and 
actual) conflicts that emerge in and around the West Burton power station. Power 
generation in West Burton goes back to 1967 when a coal-fired power station ‘next door’ 
to the one contested by NDG activists was first commissioned. The company building 
the gas-fire power station, EDF, claims the commissioning phase of the new build dates 
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back to 2007. In both instances the NDG actions come up against particular legacies of 
planning, construction, operation and governance as well as national programs and 
energy infrastructural demands. These legacies come with specific social-economic 
relations, ones that produce resistance to the idea of ‘shutting down’ the stations: from 
the involvement of local school children through the ‘discovery centre’ in the old coal-
fire power station to the people employed to build and operate the new station to the 
people and businesses who make use of the energy. 
Counting carbon works to introduce a synoptic perspective (Scott 1998:11), one that 
invalidates and obscures a host of particular issues and other non-calculative processes 
and practices such as listed above. As Scott notes, “certain forms of knowledge and 
control require a narrowing of vision” (ibid). While there are many state-led projects that 
count carbon in order to produce climate change market regimes (Arora-Jonsson et al. 
2015; Bohm, Murtola and Spoelstra 20012), my contention is that the synoptic 
perspective is not solely the province of state-making but rather as aspect of other 
political movements that seek to establish control over a terrain or space by framing the 
critical elements of that terrain legible in a specific way (ibid:4)vii. The labour involved in 
making something legible is often a labour of simplification – of not only creating a 
hierarchy of values and producing some things as representable and others opaque (as 
either private, as inconsequential or as natural) but in actually shaping the social field in 
order to socially and materially simplify it (we could note here that the role of CO2 as a 
proxy acts on the disruption of the carbon cycle in a similar simplifying fashion towards 
similar pragmatic ends). 
Scott sets out how the state makes society legible in much the same was as it makes 
nature legible, thus producing specific populations (Foucault 2007), separations (Mitchell 
2002) and historical natures (Moore 2015). A key image in his archive is scientific 
forestry. Not only were new forms of measurement and analysis introduced in order to 
better manage state forests, the forests themselves were physically changed, with a 
greater uniformity of species and generational succession introduced to ease 
management. Here we could note the similarities in Scott’s argument to accounts of 
governmentality in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Foucault (2007), 
or, returning to the discussion of the constitution of climate change as a calculative 
problem (or factish) above, note the similarities between state-making and scientific 
knowledge production (Stengers 2000). 
As argued by Scott, not every synoptic approach is violent (or even materially capable of 
such acts of violence). Violently remaking peoples and natures requires the addition of 
both what Scott calls a “high modernist ideology” – the muscular belief in a top-down, 
productivist and techno-scientific vision of progress that marries rational planning with 
fantasies of the mastery of nature – and an authoritarian state (1998:4). And while NDG 
have both a synoptic perspective and elements of a high-modernist perspective (though 
no more than elements I would suggest), they are certainly not a state-actor nor do they 
suggest they would like to be. Nor do they avoid engaging with workers or the local 
community – it is just that any engagement came after the fact of the occupation rather 
than as a central element of it, indicating a layering of prioritiesviii.  
Nonetheless counting carbon does work to synoptically frame climate infrastructure. The 
global nature of climate change and the pressing urgency of it as an issue compel climate 
activists to take up the synoptic perspective of the state. To “see like a state” is not only a 
matter of making facts into particular kinds of concerns, ones that are framed as 
technical questions (Demeritt 2006); it is to produce a particular kind of political scale, 
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one where the local is both produced as a specific political identity and cast as a 
reactionary ecological force. With climate change, what we see is the eclipse of the local 
as a site of political action: it has been measured in Parts Per Million and found wanting. 
By making infrastructure measurable, the particularities of any given piece of 
infrastructure become subject to evaluation via CO2 emissions. The fungible nature of 
climate infrastructure renders the specificities of its entanglements and connections 
subject to pragmatic consideration, where pragmatism is always-already a matter of 
global concern. In this way justice becomes a matter of global calculus, as the costs and 
benefits of any given piece of infrastructure are measured in Parts Per Million (PPM) of 
CO2 on a global scale. 
Thus the possibilities of addressing forms of life or ways of being in the world vis-à-vis a 
particular instantiation of infrastructure slip away under calculative pressure within a 
global arithmetic framework. Here the ambivalence of turning to specific pieces of 
climate infrastructure are cast aside – the lives affected, the specific visions and hopes for 
the future, the histories and ways of being in that place in the world are all negated in the 
synoptic carbon gaze. The rescaling of infrastructure from a situated to global (abstract) 
concern undoes our hold on it and our capacity to undertake the work of producing 
thick justice. 
 
Infernal arithmetic 
Thick justice requires us to be for some worlds and against others (Haraway 1997:47). It 
is a question of making alliances and ecologies, itself a polarizing labour that turns on the 
question of who or what we care for and how (Bellacasa 2012). If environmentalists are 
to consider climate change as a problem of infrastructure, then addressing climate change 
will require changing the sociotechnical arrangements of inhabited existing worlds, 
foregrounding the question of what lives ‘we’ wish to be for and what forms of life will 
be rendered unviable and unliveable.  
The infrastructure that underpins modern life in the UK is not a neutral tool but a series 
of sociotechnical arrangements that re/produce particular forms of life. Infrastructure is 
an object, the relation between objects and the grounds on which other objects operate 
(Larkin 2013:329). Infrastructure is an ambience within which we are enmeshed. It is not 
only a mode of socio-political management and rule (Anand et al. 2012), it is part of the 
specific capacities and agencies we take for granted or naturalise (Mitchell 2002:80) – at 
least until they break down (Jackson 2014). As such to contest infrastructure is to contest 
the very constitution of people’s lives. These lives may be in a state of cruel optimism 
(Berlant 2011) or toxified by the waste of late liberal energy technologies (Fortun 2014), 
but this does not make people any less attached to them. Indeed as Lauren Berlant 
suggests the lack of other visible or viable forms of life may make people all the more 
attached to their existing lives, dreams, hopes and futures, even if this means knowingly 
embracing a climate change future (2011). It is thus crucial to directly address the 
question of the intimate transformation of people’s forms of life and not approach them 
as secondary concerns to the counting of carbon. 
Returning to the power station, blocking the construction of the new gas-fire power 
station will put into question the incomes and wealth of a number of people (as well as 
their future careers and familial prospects), the socio-economic status of a region and the 
energy supply of a national grid. While it is often argued that climate change is an issue 
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that affects everyone and that to adequately address climate change will be to universal 
benefit, not everyone will be equally affected by how climate change is resolved as an 
issue. Where some people may benefit, some will not. Beyond the immediate questions 
of infrastructure there are broader considerations of the kinds of ways of life enabled by 
current energy infrastructure that may not be viable or possible if energy production was 
changed in a manner consistent with tackling climate change as an issue.  
It is rare that environmentalists will openly talk of what will be lost through successful 
efforts to address climate change. Often the talk is of green jobs, or increased happiness, 
of better health and brighter futures, and for good reason. Common sense suggests that 
campaigning on the basis of making people’s lives measurably worse would not be a 
recipe for success. The proposals for “prosperity without growth” (Jackson 2011) or 
shorter working weeks (Coote, Franklin and Simms 2010) are recognitions of the fact 
that what is required is a plan to ‘de-grow’ the economy without necessarily introducing 
social austerity.  
These proposals set out from the abstract calculus of carbon and arrive at national plans 
for tackling climate change in a just fashion. Justice here is a matter of how the 
transformation is arranged, of how the counting of carbon takes place: it is about the 
even distribution of numbers. As such the difficult question of what constitutes justice is 
evaded. More to the point, the politics of thick justice is avoided completely as it is 
already assumed that some lives will cease to be possible and must be pragmatically 
scarified in order to tackle climate change. 
I am not suggesting here that existing ways of life in the global North should not be 
disturbed in order to tackle climate change, or that climate change is not a massive and 
pressing socio-ecological concern. I am arguing that the constitution of climate change as 
a matter of counting carbon reduces the substance of political questions to pragmatic 
arithmetic. Justice becomes a matter of calculation and not of engaging in the difficult 
political work of figuring out how to live in the world, where what is at stake is 
recognized to be the continued or possible existence of forms of life. As such the global 
political scale of climate change is reproduced through calculative activism at the expense 
of thick justice. 
Given how climate change is constituted as a problem, the conflict appears as an infernal 
alternative, a situation that seems “to leave no other choice than resignation or a slightly 
hollow sounding denunciation” (Stengers and Pignarre 2011:25). You can choose to 
engage in the messy politics of constituting place and produce thick justice or you can 
adequately deal with climate change as an issue, and leave political concerns for after that 
problem is solved. You can have justice and an unlivable world, or you can solve climate 
change and impose green austerity. You can’t have both. 
The cost of counting carbon is the loss of the particular (Jasanoff 2010), and with it the 
loss of the capacity to pose questions of thick justice. This double loss is a function of 
the way in which the problem of climate change is constituted. As a global issue, one that 
promises catastrophe on unimaginable scales, it functions to subordinate questions of 
how we should or can live to questions of how we are to manage climate change.  
Re-scaling climate change 
Donna Haraway suggests that we need to be attentive to the ways in which our concepts 
work: what they enable and disable as modes of engaging with the world (1997:36). As a 
mathematical description of the breakdown in the carbon cycle, the concept of climate 
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change enables us to take hold of the problem of global warming through a world-
spanning technical apparatus (Edwards 2010) and to subject it to policy analysis and 
political debate (Demeritt 2006). At the same time the scale-making of climate change 
renders questions of thick justice inaccessible and de-situates political agency, making it a 
matter of global political action. The production of a sense of planet (Heise 2008) as a 
means of ‘seeing’ climate change and working to mitigate it implies a global mode of 
politics and the capacity to see like a state.  
Climate change activism as an expression of a global politics sets out to overcome the 
friction of situated encounters that may block, slow down or alter action deemed 
necessary to arrest climate change (Tsing 2004:5). The global synoptic perspective of 
climate activism articulates the frictions of localized engagements as impediments to 
effective action on climate change. Pragmatism manifests as unscientific compromise; 
compromise that endangers all life on earth in the face of the looming climate 
catastrophe. 
Such a synoptic perspective undermines questions of thick justice. It does not entirely 
silence such questions however. Within any material encounter with energy 
infrastructure, as in NDG’s action, it is impossible to not to engage in debate or conflict 
around the conditions of people’s lives: how they can and will be able to live, the 
capacities they have or will have, who they can or can’t be. Indeed, after the NDG action 
started these are exactly the sorts of encounters that begun to take place. Rather than 
maintaining that these situated concerns for jobs, energy, ways of life, etc are necessarily 
regressive or anti-environmental, or that they can be tackled without there being any 
conflict with a reduction in carbon emissions, there needs to be a sustained engagement 
with questions of how we are to live without the assumption that the situated or ‘local’ 
must necessarily be subordinated to the global (Gibson-Graham 2002). Better yet, 
infrastructure could provide the opportunity for foregoing the local/global dyad in 
favour of a politics that ‘stays with the trouble’ of specific infrastructures (Haraway 
2014). At stake here are the questions: is it possible to realize the sort of open “militant 
particuarlism” that David Featherstone advocates (2005) through climate infrastructure 
despite the framing effects of climate change as a political problem? Is it possible to take 
hold of the problem of climate change without counting carbon or mobilizing a global 
political scale? Is it possible to make climate change speak otherwise? 
This would not mean foregoing a planetary or biospheric (in contrast to global) 
perspective of climate change. Rather, it could mean incorporating climate change into 
the messy negotiations that surround the question of how want to inhabit the future in 
place. Politics in this instance is not only a matter of being for some worlds against 
others, but for some scales against others. The rescaling of agency vis-à-vis climate 
change is already taking place as infrastructures moves to the centre of political action. 
Pipelines, oil and gas fields, power stations and more are all slowly moving to the centre 
of climate change politics. In doing so, it will be increasingly difficult to escape the “grip 
of the encounter” (Tsing 2004:5) where questions of how we are to live cannot be 
referred to a global arithmetic or avoided. 
Such an encounter works to reveal climate change not as a global problem, but one that 
emerges piece by piece through specific encounters, and thus one amenable to situated 
works of activism. Just as capitalism is constructed piece by piece as a globalizing project, 
so too is climate change produced through specific labours, networks, conflicts and 
projects as a global object of concern. Rather than uncritically accept the inheritance of 
such globalizing projects, a shift to more intimate modes of infrastructural activism could 
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open up the construction and reproduction of both climate change as a biospheric state 
and, it might be said, capitalism as an organizing force of the current world-system. 
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Endnotes 																																																								
i I would like to thank Anja Kanngieser, Stephanie Wakefield and Gavin Brown for their helpful 
comments and reading of an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to acknowledge the 
Fisher Center, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, and the 2015-6 Fisher Center Fellows for 
both the time to work on the paper and innumerable useful discussions on many of the concepts 
and arguments therein.  
ii This paper assumes some knowledge of climate change, including an awareness that 20C is the 
internationally recognized level of dangerous climate change. 
iii I would consider scientific realism to be a kind of naïve socio-technical realism, where a realist 
philosophical approach to the constitution of scientific facts is bound to an overly optimistic 
sense that scientific facts necessarily translate smoothly into matters of political concern. See 
Latour, Bruno. 2004b. "Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of 
Concern." Critical Inquiry 30(Winter 2004):225-48. (do you need to put the whole reference in 
here? ) 
iv Hence the notable shift towards resilience as a container for ecological thought. See Evans, 
Brad, and Julia Reid. 2014. Resilient Life: The art of living dangerously. Cambridge: Polity, MacKinnon, 
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Danny, and Kate Driscoll Derickson. 2013. "From resilience to resourcefulness: A critique of 
resilience policy and activism." Progress in Human Geography 37(2):253–70, Neocleous, Mark. 2013. 
"Resisting Resilience." Radical Philosophy 178(Mar/Apr 2013). 
v I am not exploring the diversity of environmental and environmental justice movements in the 
global South in this paper. My focus in on opening up how climate change is constituted in as a 
problem by environmental activists in the Anglospheric global North. Given the at times 
hegemonic (or neo-colonial) role of Northern activists in global climate change policy and 
discourse construction, such a critique obliquely suggests the need to engage with non-Northern 
modes of environmental praxis and non-Northern environmental imaginaries, particularly as they 
engage with and critique climate science. In addition, I do not intend on rehearsing the various 
arguments for and against the concept of the global North (or South) in this paper. I am making 
use of the (rough) division to gesture towards a particular area as conceived of by 
environmentalists in countries such as the UK and USA, where talk of global North-South 
politics is part of the political and policy discourse. vi	Dobson sets out to articulate an alternative approach to cosmopolitanism that he names thick 
cosmopolitanism, one that overcome the separations of a global humanity without abolishing the 
specificity of place: that is, to construct a cosmopolitan politics that sets out from material 
connection, using global warming as a basis for such common grounding. I would suggest that 
such a project necessarily requires interrogating how the materiality of the common ground is 
constituted, and what forms of life and agency are enabled or disabled by such a constitution.	
vii This is not to claim that the presence of a synoptic perspective indicates a desire to occupy the 
state, to produce a state-power or of an orientation around the state as an organizational form 
(though it might). To see like a state is not to become the state.	viii	There were several tweets by NDG indicating that some workers had contacted them offering 
support, but that making this support public would cost them their jobs. In addition, many of the 
activists involved have been and continue to be involved in community energy and climate 
campaigns. In this particular instance however, both worker and community engagement came 
after the occupation, no doubt in order to ensure the occupation took place but also indicating 
the prioritization of the occupation over engagement.	
